The Reminder is making its archives back to 2003 available on our website. Please note that, due to technical limitations, archive articles are presented without the usual formatting.
The main purpose of British generals, it sometimes seems, is to say aloud the things that American generals think privately but dare not say in public. Things like: ÒWeÕre not going to win this war.Ó That was what Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, the senior British commander in Afghanistan, said in early October at the end of his six-month tour. Carleton-Smith did not say that the foreign forces in Afghanistan will lose the war. He said that they could not deliver a Òdecisive military victory.Ó The best they might do, over a period of years, would be to reduce the Taliban insurgency Òto a manageable level...thatÕs not a strategic threat and can be managed by the Afghan army.Ó ÒIf the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement,Ó Carleton-Smith continued, Òthen thatÕs precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this. That shouldnÕt make people uncomfortable.Ó The truth is that the foreign forces are backing one side in an Afghan civil war. If the war cannot end in a decisive victory for one side, then it must end in a negotiated peace okay with both sides. The reason neither side can win is that each can hold its own territory indefinitely. The US allied itself with the main northern ethnic groups, who together account for about 60 per cent of the population, in order to drive the Taliban from power in 2001. But the Taliban were and still are the major political vehicle for the Pashtuns, who are about 40 per cent of the population. The Pashtuns were traditionally the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan, but in 2001 they were effectively driven from power by the other ethnic groups and their Western allies. That is why they are in revolt: the area where Western troops are fighting Òthe TalibanÓ are all the areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan where Pashtuns are in the majority, and nowhere else. In practice, the foreigners are fighting Pashtun nationalism. That is why they cannot win. On the other hand, and for the same reason, the Taliban cannot win a decisive victory either. They never established control over northern Afghanistan even when they ruled in Kabul, mainly because the other ethnic minorities saw them as an exclusively Pashtun group. Moreover, most non-Pashtuns who did fall under their rule were alienated by their brutality, and would certainly not welcome them back in sole power. But a negotiated peace deal must give the Pashtuns a fair share of power, and that means giving the Taliban a share of the power. This is seen as unthinkable in most Western capitals, but it is a traditional Afghan way of ending the ethnic bust-ups that have always plagued the country, and it will happen sooner or later. Does this mean that Afghanistan will re-emerge as a base for international terrorism? Unlikely, since it would not be to the advantage of any Afghan government, even one that included Taliban elements, to attract that kind of international opprobrium. Besides, international terrorists donÕt need ÒbasesÓ to prepare their attacks; a few rooms will do. In a recently leaked diplomatic cable the deputy French ambassador in Kabul, Franois Fitou, reported that the British ambassador there, Sherard Cowper-Coles, told him the strategy for Afghanistan was Òdoomed to failure. In SherardÕs view Òthe security situation is getting worse, so is corruption and the government has lost all trustÓ. The usual denials followed, but that is exactly what British officials there say in private. So it would make sense to announce a deadline for pulling out foreign troops and start negotiating for a peace settlement now. Waiting is unlikely to produce a better deal. Which is probably why President Hamid Karzai said recently he had asked the king of Saudi Arabia to mediate in negotiations with the Taliban.
