The Reminder is making its archives back to 2003 available on our website. Please note that, due to technical limitations, archive articles are presented without the usual formatting.
Why is Prime Minister Stephen HarperÕs government cheering on a misguided nuclear co-operation deal between the United States and India that is an affront to arms control efforts? Pressed hard by U.S. President George W. Bush, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held its nose last Friday and opted to treat India as a Òspecial case.Ó It endorsed a deal that will let the U.S. sell India ÒcivilianÓ nuclear technology and materials. U.S. nuclear sales to India may now be inevitable. That sad prospect is no reason for Foreign Affairs Minister David Emerson to proclaim witlessly that Òthis will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime,Ó as he did last week. Rather, it will encourage other nuclear mavericks, including Pakistan and Iran, to lobby for the same treatment. Arms experts see it as U.S. hypocrisy and fear the double standard will cripple non-proliferation efforts. India has not been known to export its nuclear savvy. Even so, it is one of the few nuclear-armed countries that remains outside the non-proliferation treaty. Until now, the U.S., Canada and other suppliers have been barred from selling to them. And rightly so. The U.S.-India deal opens the floodgate to sales, without corresponding controls. India has 22 nuclear reactors. It will open 14 to IAEA inspection (up from six) in exchange for technology and fuel. That gave the IAEA just enough cover to approve the deal. But India will still have eight military reactors not subject to inspection. Bush hopes to cement India as an ally to tap into a potential $150 billion market in Indian nuclear purchases, and to contain ChinaÕs influence. But supplying India with more ÒcivilianÓ technology, reactors and fuel without adequate safeguards will give its military more high-tech knowledge. It will also free up existing unsupervised reactors to produce more fissile materials for bombs. Canada is wrong to endorse this folly. Canada and others in the Nuclear Suppliers Group should insist on stricter safeguards before India is granted any waiver to buy supplies. The group should require India to sign a legally binding ban on testing nuclear weapons and on technology transfer. India should be required, as well, to curb its production of weapons-grade materials. Canadians are used to seeing the Harper government toe the U.S. line. But EmersonÕs cheerleading is too much. We should have tried harder to mitigate the damage this deal is bound to do.
