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Inquest report closes painful chapter

The Reminder is making its archives back to 2003 available on our website. Please note that, due to technical limitations, archive articles are presented without the usual formatting.

The Reminder is making its archives back to 2003 available on our website. Please note that, due to technical limitations, archive articles are presented without the usual formatting.

A painful chapter in Flin FlonÕs history came to a close Tuesday with the release of an inquest report into the deadly 2000 HBMS smelter explosions. In his nearly 300-page report, Judge Robert Cummings lays out several recommendations, including that regulations should be amended to state that Ò[w]ater should not be allowed to contact molten material under any circumstances.Ó ÒIf water is to be used on premises where molten material is present,Ó he wrote, Òit should only be used after an engineering study has shown that it can be used safely and after such study delineates the parameters and restrictions on its use.Ó Cummings also recommended that the Workplace Safety and Health Act declare that no worker should be tethered to mobile machinery. He further called for the Operation of Mines regulation to define Ònear missesÓ and place an onus on everyone in a workplace to report a near miss. The Manitoba government said it will move quickly to act on the recommendations. A spokesperson for HBMS parent HudBay Minerals Inc. said the company will Òbe working hard and looking at the implementation ofÓ CummingsÕ recommendations. The companyÕs Òpriority is to ensure that our operations are run as safely as possible,Ó David Bryson, chief financial officer, told The Canadian Press. CummingsÕ report marked the conclusion of a provincial inquest into a series of explosions that occurred in the smelterÕs reverberatory furnace at about 1:45 a.m. on August 8, 2000. The furnace had been on a scheduled maintenance shutdown. According to a prior Manitoba Labour investigation, workers were using water hoses on the top floor to wash out the calcine feed hoppers and remove dust build-up. On the feed floor, workers used hoses to clean off sand and slag build-up at the front of the furnace. At the same time, they employed a jackhammer to open an access hole through the furnace wall. Investigations revealed that the explosions occurred when water came into contact with heated material. Fourteen workers were injured, including 33-year-old Steven Ewing, who had reportedly been washing a catwalk above the furnace when it exploded. Ewing suffered burns to most of his body and died eight days later in hospital. In his report, Cummings said he remains Òof the very strong opinion, that if there had not been water present in the furnace as a result of run-off from the washdown, the explosion would not have occurred.Ó ÒIt was not a matter of managing the water in a better manner,Ó he wrote. ÒThe only certainty is that if the dust could be removed in another manner without the use of water, no explosion would occur.Ó The year following the incident, HBMS was fined $150,000 after pleading guilty to having an unsafe workplace. But Cummings found Òno evidence in [sic] improper management practices on the evening of the tragedy.Ó It is Òquite apparent that all five of the managers on shift that eveningÓ were to make decisions on how to proceed, he wrote. ÒThere was no evidence brought forward at the inquest that suggested that this management style contributed to a dangerous situation or contributed in any way to the explosion,Ó read the report. Cummings dedicated several pages to a 1999 decision to prepare an instructional manual for the upcoming furnace shutdown. ÒAll of the witnesses who could testify on this point knew that the manual would not be completed prior to the 2000 shutdown,Ó he wrote, Òand in fact some testified that a shutdown would have to be completed prior to knowing all of the many details which would be included in a manual.Ó Cummings reached the conclusion that the Òmanual was being prepared by the most experienced persons available and in a manner which included safety as one of the top priorities.Ó See 'Start' on pg. Continued from pg. ÒEven this effort to make a start on a manual meant...that the 2000 shutdown was planned better than any prior shutdown,Ó wrote the judge, referencing witness testimony. ÒIt is trite to state that a manual should have been prepared long before 2000; the simple fact of the matter is that it was not. The important question is whether a more complete manual might have avoided the tragic events of August 7 and 8, 2000. It is my opinion that they could not have been so avoided.Ó Later in his report, Cummings added, ÒThe decision to wash above the furnace was made months before and in accordance with the practice during shutdowns for as long as anyone could remember...Ó A report Wednesday in the Winnipeg Sun quoted one of the employees present that night who said workers were told to clean the furnace area less than an hour after it had been shut off to cool down Ð much less time than had been given in previous years, according to the article. HBMS has already pledged to never again spray water on a furnace filled with molten copper. Air blowers are now reportedly used for the cleaning. CummingsÕ report was swiftly criticized by the Manitoba Federation of Labour. According to The Canadian Press, the organization hoped the report would lead to new powers for workplace safety committees. ÒThereÕs nothing in legislation that gives these committees teeth,Ó federation president Darlene Dziewit told the news agency. The reportÕs release comes after nearly five years of lengthy delays and legal wrangling. The inquest got underway in early 2004 but quickly ground to a halt when Crown counsel Marty Minuk refused an HBMS request to turn over transcripts of interviews he conducted with company employees. HBMS launched an appeal, arguing that it should have access to the transcripts as evidence. According to CBC News, company lawyers said they attempted to interview the same employees but received little cooperation. Minuk, meanwhile, maintained that the transcripts were confidential. In time the matter found its way to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which in September 2006 ruled that the transcripts should be made available to all parties with standing at the inquest. Hearings resumed at the Flin Flon Courthouse in April of this year. After a break of several months, the final hearings took place in September.

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